Collaborative Working Sessions - Convince others
Take on the problem of spreading the word and convince people that should be convinced that reproducible builds are important.
Participants (TODO: self-update full names :) ?):
- Laj /Julien
- Gabor
- Alice
- Andrey
- Sasa
- Aman
- Jarek Potiuk
- Michael Winser
Initial thoughts !
Audience - and what pain we solve to those audiences without talking to reproducibility
The roles that we can see in the ecosyte:
- App builders - who create : individual maintaienr
- Distros (composers that rebuild stuff) : Debian/ Suse/ F-Droid
- Package repos: PyPI/ NPM / F-Droid (multiple roles)
- Customers & end users: Corporates, SMBs, Individual users
- Business owners: Proj Managers/Product Manager/ Biz types
- Science computation on the data: Science community
- Private and government security focused organizations that are investing into security: Alpha-Omega, Sovereign Tech Agency
- Governments / regulators / standard bodies: EU Commission, US NSA
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Developers and contributors, maintainers to other projects using them - various “technical” users of the apps - other open source project, OS Rebuild,
- (!) malicious actors - we do not really need to include them
Roles can be mixed. Conclusions: we need to be read for crisis to happen (inevitable) - it will happen and we should be ready.
What’s next ?
- How we can drivate the interest?
- Did it happen with XZ utils case? Yes - it did (Google people came to reproducible Summit for example) - but it is not sticky.
- We need more of those - but in a controlled way.
- We likely need a chaos-monkey kind of approach where we induce some crisises in a more controlled way.
- Is audit maybe a solution ? Security is always at the bottom of the pile - certificates ?
- App builders have a lot of other problems to worry about - we have not a good tooling
Why do we suck at marketing RB ?
- no turnkey tooling builders can use (*)
- not clear build attestation status and lack of visibility
- hard to understand outcomes and benefits (*)
- no clear and established definition - and commmunication to different users
- tampering as a worry is something that humans genuinly understand and they might have implicit expectations about stuff “not being tampered with” (example https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicago_Tylenol_murders which resulted in drugs having seals that make it obvious that they were tampered with).
- Lack of connecting risk to revenues
- Lack of terminology/language education - reproducibility is a fancy word but it does not have meaning (*)
- maturity problem - we are very early stage and we do not have yet right marketing, promotion of what we are doing (*)
Proposed Strategy and tactics
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We need to work on more “commercial” or “business” way to promote what we want to promote - not necessarily in technical and precise terms, but in a way that can be easily conveyed to wider audience
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The “Software Tamper Protection League” might be a better term to use for example (*)
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We need some understandable goals, language and drive business demand with “Sign up here to be tamper-proof with your software!!!”
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We need to prioritise problems and actors - our goal is to get some people to dring the cool aid of our and drive the solution (*)
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The good solution is when things are prevented, but the problem is that this makes it difficult to “promote” it and have people drink the “cool aid” (*)
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Reduce the toil to become reproducible and normalize the concept. Productisation of the solution space is needed for scaled adoption
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Do we have some good examples - from the past for Developers? There are good success stories Tools for automation onboarding from days to minutes. Tooling to automate things scale.
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Do we have some good examples - from the past for Business and Commercial users?
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How can we promote “Tamper proof” approach better ?
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Introduce tooling that injects “Tampering checks” into the engineering pipelines - on all engineering levels and organisational boundaries - those should be “red-team” kind of audits - auditing the whole supply chain and making it “loud” and showing when the “fence” works - when we get to the crisis (which will happen eventually).
We should not let any good next crisis happens to leverage outputs of such work